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The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and subsequent po-
tential threats to U.S. transportation systems have presented an
urgent need for government agencies such as state Departments
of Transportation DOTs to develop emergency response plans to
quickly react to the possible consequences of an extreme event.
Highway bridges, as a critical component of the nation’s transpor-
tation network, have been brought to closer attention by govern-
ment agencies. A pooled-fund research project, led by the Texas
Department of Transportation and titled ”Rapid Bridge Replace-
ment Techniques,” was conducted beginning in March 2002.
Other entities participating in the project were the state DOTs of
Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Ohio, and South Carolina.
One of the tasks associated with the research project was to
conduct several case studies of previous bridge replacements fol-
lowing extreme events. These events included explosion and fire
caused by roadway vehicle impact, waterway vessel collision,
flood damage, and earthquake damage. The research team re-
viewed 26 bridge incident cases in the United States and overseas
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They were the I-95 Chester Creek Bridge in Pennsylvania in
1998, the Governor Thomas E. Dewey Thruway Bridge in New
York in 1997, and the I-40 Webbers Falls Bridge in Oklahoma in
2002. The reasons for which these bridges were chosen were that
all were critical components in the nation’s interstate system and
the incidents had significant impacts on the traveling public and
surrounding communities.
Research Objective
The objective of this research was to identify strategies and tech-
nologies to quickly restore highway bridges, a critical component
of the nation’s transportation network, to their use in case they are
damaged or destroyed by extreme events. A case study method-
ology was utilized to accomplish this objective. By studying pre-
vious cases, the research team sought to identify and expand on
lessons learned, address which actions did and did not work well
given the circumstances of the incident, and incorporate these
lessons into an emergency response plan for highway bridges.
Case Study Methodology
Case studies were conducted using a three-step approach. First,
the research team reviewed the literature related to the cases,
including newspaper articles, conference and journal papers, tech-
nical reports, and Web sites. Second, the research team inter-
viewed the people who were involved in the case via telephone.
These people came from state DOTs, design firms, contractors,
and material suppliers. In these telephone interviews, researchers
asked them a series of questions regarding their roles and knowl-
edge about the case. After the first two steps, the research team
had an initial understanding of each case, and unanswered ques-
tions were clearly outlined. The third step was to conduct a survey
comprising the previously unanswered questions and additional
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needed information related to each case. The survey questionnaire
consisted of five aspects, including contracting method, engineer-
ing, construction, state DOT support, and material supplier and
vendor support.
There were several reasons for choosing the survey method to
acquire knowledge. First, the survey was a relatively easy way
to solicit answers to the same questions from several people. Sec-
ond, the survey questionnaire provided, in general, a very clear
statement of the problems. Third, the survey gave people more
time to respond to the questions as compared to personal inter-
views. Fourth, the survey results were easy to compare and ana-
lyze. At the end of each case study, a report was generated
including the lessons learned. This paper presents the I-40 Web-
bers Falls Bridge case in Oklahoma and lessons learned from this
incident.
I-40 Webbers Falls Bridge Incident
On the Memorial Day weekend of May 26, 2002, the towboat
Robert Y. Love, pushing two empty barges owned by the Magno-
lia Marine Transport Company of Vicksburg, Mississippi, was
moving upstream on the Arkansas River when it hit the I-40 Web-
bers Falls Bridge around 7:47 am. The incident caused a portion
of the bridge, which is part of McClellan-Kerr Arkansas River
Navigation System waterway, to fall into the river. Drivers of 11
vehicles were unaware of the bridge collapse and plunged 19 m
62 ft into the river. A total of 14 people died in the incident. The
Oklahoma Department of Transportation ODOT closed I-40
near the bridge and the Navigation System. Interstate 40, one of
the nation’s three major east-west interstate highways, carries
about 20,000 vehicles each day, transporting people, goods, and
materials coast to coast Stidger 2002.
Damage Assessment
The 20 m 64 ft wide, 606 m 1988 ft long, four-lane bridge was
built in 1967 over the Arkansas River near Webbers Falls, Okla-
homa “Oklahoma” 2002. The original structure was a continu-
ous haunched steel girder bridge with a 61–101–61 m 201–330–
200 ft main span combined with steel girder approach spans and
a reinforced concrete deck. The steel girders were supported by
12 concrete piers. Fig. 1 shows the normal barge path and the
errant barge path that resulted in a collision with the bridge. The
barge was about 91 m 300 ft outside the regular navigation
Fig. 1. I-40 bridge incident sketchchannel main channel when it rammed into the unprotected
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piers and partially damaging another indicated as the D pier.
Four spans totaling approximately 152 m 500 ft were also dam-
aged. Span 1 38 m 126 ft, shown as damage type A was
damaged, but did not fall. Span 2 38 m 125 ft, shown as dam-
age type B and Span 4 61 m 201 ft, shown as damage type B
partially fell into the river. Span 3 38 m 126 ft, shown as
damage type C completely collapsed into the river. Fig. 2 shows
the damaged bridge.
Detour Routes
Shortly after the incident, ODOT established detour routes for the
traveling public as shown in Fig. 3. Eastbound drivers were in-
structed to take exit 278 at Warner, go south on SH-2, turn east
on SH-9, turn north on US-59, and rejoin I-40 near Sallisaw at
exit 308. The eastbound detour was 92 km 57 mi long Greiner
2002. Westbound travelers were directed to take exit 291 at
Gore, go north on SH-10, turn west on US-64, turn south on
SH-100, and rejoin I-40 east of Muskogee Turnpike at exit 287.
The westbound detour was 10 km 6 mi long Greiner 2002. In
order to reduce the traffic volume on area highways, ODOT in-
structed long-distance travelers from northern Oklahoma, includ-
ing Kansas, to go south on I-35, then east on US-412/Cimarron
Turnpike to avoid area traffic congestion. Long-distance drivers
from northeastern Oklahoma, Tulsa, and surrounding areas were
directed to go east on US-412/Cherokee Turnpike, turn south on
I-540, then turn east onto I-40 in Ft. Smith, Arkansas. Travelers
coming into Oklahoma from Texas to access I-40 east of Warner,
Oklahoma, were instructed to take I-30 from Texas into Arkansas,
and then take I-40 into Oklahoma.
Due to the large increase in traffic volume on the detour high-
ways, it was necessary for ODOT to take immediate action in the
form of heavy maintenance, including overlays on portions of
the detour highways, to prevent pavement failures that would
endanger the traveling public ODOT 2002. Several emergency
maintenance contracts were issued to resurface highway pave-
ments. Glover Construction Company of Muskogee was awarded
contracts to resurface 12.4 km 7.7 mi of SH-2 beginning in
Porum, 1 km 0.62 mi of SH-100 starting in Gore, and 7.7 km
4.8 mi of US-59 in LeFlore County. Tiger Industrial Transpor-
tation System, Inc., received a contract to resurface 9.5 km
5.9 mi of SH-9 in Haskell County. Also, ODOT inspected 42
bridges on the detour routes and performed maintenance work,
replacing bearings under the bridge decks on two bridges, located
Fig. 2. Overview of damaged bridgeon SH-2 south of Warner and on SH-9 in the Whitefield area.
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Recovery
Immediately after the incident, ODOT—working with other agen-
cies, such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Coast
Guard, the National Transportation Safety Board, local police, the
Oklahoma Army National Guard, and MeClellan-Kerr Naviga-
tional Office—engaged in rescue and recovery efforts. ODOT
awarded a cost plus emergency contract to the Jensen Construc-
tion Company to remove wreckage and stabilize damaged por-
tions of the bridge so that victims and vehicles could be
recovered. Jensen Construction, headquartered in Iowa, had an
office in Tulsa. At that time, the company had the necessary
equipment and personnel nearby, because it was building a US-59
bridge over the Arkansas River. The recovery effort lasted 5 days.
The major challenges during the recovery included: 1 coordina-
tion of first responders; 2 establishment of access and staging
areas; 3 logistics of multiagency effects; 4 establishing com-
munications; and 5 stabilization of the damaged structure.
Demolition
Demolition started as soon as the recovery effort ended. ODOT
awarded a lump sum contract, a total of $850,000, to the Jensen
Construction Company for demolition work necessary to remove
the damaged sections of the bridge on June 3, 2002. The duration
of the contract was 16 days. Jensen would receive a $50,000
per day bonus for each day it finished ahead of schedule and
would be penalized $50,000 per day for each day over schedule
Illia 2002. The demolition work was accomplished on time, in
16 days.
The demolition crews knocked down the remaining piers first,
and then began breaking up the concrete on the spans. Spans 1
and 2 were brought down using explosives, and the debris was
removed from the site. Span 3, which had completely fallen into
the river, had to be removed using underwater demolition. The
working environment for the underwater demolition was hazard-
ous due to poor visibility. Demolition of the damaged section of
Span 4 was the most challenging task. This span was partially
Fig. 3. I-damaged. One end rested on the barges, while the other end was
340 / JOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENTstill attached to the undamaged bridge, as shown in Fig. 2. The
remainder of the bridge structure could have been further dam-
aged if the crews had not been careful during the demolition. To
prevent this from happening, the Magnolia Marine Transport
Company stabilized the barges and the crews constantly moni-
tored the movements of the bridge and barges. Combinations of
demolition devices including a wrecking ball, explosives, con-
crete shears, and other cutting devices were used to meet the
different needs at the site. The debris removed from the accident
site was piled on a 2 ha 5 ac site on the river’s west bank and
was trucked or floated away during the demolition.
Design for Replacement
ODOT contacted the prequalified design consultants to prepare
plans for the repair work on the day of the incident. The design
contract was awarded to Poe & Associates, Inc., of Oklahoma
City on May 28, 2002. The design contract specified that the cost
of the design should be no more than $137,000 and the design
firm should furnish biddable plans within 16 days Greiner 2002.
ODOT provided an incentive of $5,000 for every day the design
firm beat the 16-day schedule and a disincentive of $2,400 for
every day over 16. Poe & Associates started the design on May 29
and finished on June 9, four days ahead of schedule. The scope of
the design included three new prestressed concrete beam spans,
replacement of an existing structural steel span, three piers, and
associated details. Typically, designing such structures would take
4–6 months. However, with help from ODOT and a steel detailer,
Poe & Associates accomplished the design in just 12 days, which
was a tremendous time saver for the replacement project. Major
reasons for the design success were that ODOT provided the
original drawings immediately to the design firm and ODOT en-
gineers were on call 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, to quickly
answer any questions that the designers had. The most difficult
challenges for the design firm were coordinating the design team
members and keeping up with each designer’s progress from day
to day to ensure quality control and design checks. Each design
our map40 detelement received at least one check, and sometimes two. Another
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challenge was to keep designers mentally focused while working
from 12 to 14 hours per day for 12 consecutive days.
The designers for the repair work made several changes on the
original plans and specifications in order to expedite the replace-
ment process. Before the incident, Spans 1, 2, and 3 were three
continuous steel plate girders. After the incident, three precast,
prestressed concrete girders were utilized in Spans 1, 2, and 3
in lieu of the original steel plate girders. Using concrete girders
reduced the material delivery time, but increased the bridge
dead load. The existing abutment could not be used due to the
increased load. Also, due to the load increase, the span lengths
were changed from approximately 38 to 40 m 125 to 130 ft
for Spans 1, 2, and 3. This allowed the new abutment to be built
4.6 m 15 ft behind the existing abutment without removing the
old abutment seat and steel piling. The original bridge was built
as separate superstructures with a small gap between the direc-
tional travel lanes. This gap was eliminated in Spans 1, 2, and 3
of the new structure so that one concrete placement could be
made instead of separate placements.
Span 4 was the end span of the bridge main span. The end of
the span, 38 m 125 ft, was rebuilt with the same structural type
steel plate girder to match the undamaged structure, but with a
thicker web to eliminate transverse and longitudinal stiffeners.
Before connecting the new steel girders with the existing girders
in Span 4, heat straightening, a treatment procedure, was imple-
mented to the existing girders to repair the damage. In this repair
process, a limited amount of heat was applied in specific patterns
to the deformed regions of damaged steel in repetitive heating and
cooling cycles to produce a gradual straightening of the material
Federal Highway Administration FHWA 2002. To give the
contractor some flexibility, placement of the concrete deck was
given an option for full width or with a construction joint at the
centerline.
The old piers had two columns supporting them. The new
piers were three column structures supported by drilled shafts.
Pier 3 was rebuilt at the original station. Its three columns were
spaced to straddle the existing spread footings that were left in
place. The new piers were 2.7 m 9 ft in diameter under web
wall portions, which was 0.6 m 2 ft larger than the original.
Fig. 4 shows the new pier structure under construction. The new
piers were constructed with a construction joint at the top of web
walls, which were full column width with some chamfering at the
ends for ease of forming. Substructure concrete was permitted to
be loaded at 75% of design strength.
Fig. 4. New pier structures under constructionIn addition to these changes, new specifications allowed using
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diaphragms for prestressed concrete beams, and the concrete ma-
turity method. Concrete maturity is a method for determining
real-time in-place concrete strength. As soon as the concrete
reached 100% design strength and had a minimum of three days
curing, concrete forms were permitted to be removed and moment
loadings were allowed to be applied to the structure. The concrete
maturity method procedure is specified by the American Society
for Testing and Materials ASTM C1074, Standard Practice for
Estimating Concrete Strength by the Maturity Method.
Bridge Reconstruction
The bridge reconstruction contract was awarded using the “A plus
B” competitive bid method FHWA 2002. The “A plus B”
method is one of the innovative project delivery methods that has
been developed and implemented in the construction industry
in recent years. “A” represents the cost of the project and “B”
indicates the duration of the project. Using this method, the owner
will evaluate the bid proposals based on not only the cost, but
also the schedule. This is the ideal method for an emergency
bridge reconstruction project, because time is of the essence. In
the bid document, ODOT specified 72 days as the maximum time
allowed to complete the reconstruction. ODOT held a prebid
meeting on Saturday, June 8, 2002. The potential bidders had an
opportunity to visit the site to assess the damage to the bridge and
the site conditions. The contract was issued to the Gilbert Central
Corporation of Fort Worth for $10.9 million with a 57-day sched-
ule on June 12, 2002 FHWA 2002. The contract had a $6,000
per hour bonus/penalty clause without cap either way. ODOT
would pay Gilbert an additional $6,000 for every hour it was
ahead of the original schedule and penalize the company $6,000
for every hour it was behind the schedule. The reconstruction
started at 6:00 pm on June 12, 2002, with two 12-hour shifts per
day, 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. On average, there were
70–80 workers on the site. The project finished at 10:00 am on
July 29, 2002, for a total time of 46 days and 16 hours, the fastest
completion of a project of its type in U.S. history. Reconstruction
was ahead of the original schedule by 10 days, 8 hours, and
Gilbert received a $1,488,000 bonus. ODOT also benefited from
the early completion of the project, because traffic engineers es-
timated that the total user cost was $430,000 per day for every
day that the bridge was not open. Under normal conditions, it
would have taken at least six months to finish the reconstruction.
The major scope of repair work involved constructing a 160 m
524 ft long combination concrete and steel girder that would
tie into the undamaged four-lane bridge structure, three piers, four
spans, an abutment, a 9 m 30 ft long concrete approach slab,
and a 12 m 40 ft long roadway section. Reconstruction began on
the west side of the bridge and moved toward the still-standing
roadway in the center. Both ODOT and Gilbert committed the
necessary resources and furnished experienced supervisors and
crews to ensure that the project would be constructed as fast as
possible. ODOT created a special construction residency. The as-
sistant bridge engineer for design was on call 24 hours per day,
7 days per week. A 13-member team of inspectors was formed to
oversee the reconstruction of the bridge. Some of the inspectors
were retired ODOT employees. The average experience for the 13
bridge inspectors was 20 years. Inspectors were also sent to the
steel fabrication shops to make sure that the steel plate girder
beams were fabricated as designed and satisfied all the standards.
Under normal circumstances, ODOT probably would have only
two inspectors assigned to such a project.
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Gilbert Central Corporation, a subsidiary of Peter Kiewit Sons,
Inc., had built two bridges in Tulsa and was the contractor on
major repairs to Oklahoma City’s cross-town expressway. The
company was also working on a large bridge at Dallas–Fort
Worth Airport and an $800 million bridge in the San Francisco
Bay area. To meet the challenge of the I-40 bridge, Gilbert de-
ployed multiple crews working concurrently, employed a full time
on-site scheduler to prepare daily critical path method CPM
schedule and resource requirements, and mobilized backup equip-
ment. The company had experienced decision makers on site to
quickly respond to any issues or questions during the reconstruc-
tion. To make sure that safety would not be compromised during
the repair project, Gilbert offered a $2,000 safety bonus to each
crew member if they had no accidents at the end of the project.
One of the major challenges during the reconstruction was the
delivery of steel plate girders. Immediately after the incident,
ODOT decided to replace much of the damaged steel girders
with precast, prestressed concrete girders, with the exception
of Span 4, which was tied into the existing bridge, because ODOT
anticipated that steel suppliers could not meet the aggressive re-
construction schedule. Span 4 required 210 tons 190,680 kg
of steel including four replacement girders, 12 cross frames, four
lines of stringer beams, and lateral bracing Melnick 2002. De-
livery of the structural steel was a critical activity on the CPM
schedule. The National Steel Bridge Alliance NSBA and several
steel fabricators assured ODOT that steel delivery could meet the
ambitious schedule. On June 2, 2002, Tensor Engineering sent its
premier bridge detailer to the steel design firm White & Associ-
ates, of Oklahoma City, to work on the design drawings. The
designers utilized heavier webs to eliminate the need for most of
the stiffeners, which ultimately sped up the fabrication process.
All design drawings were sent via e-mail to speed the process.
Tensor Engineering sent the mill orders to the fabricator, Trinity
Industries, Inc., on June 12, 2002. Detailed shop drawings were
completed over the next five days and approved by ODOT in the
shop on the day they were submitted.
One of the challenges during the design of shop drawings was
how to match the existing field splice. The fabricator requested
the last 1.5 m 5 ft of the existing damaged girders on Span 4 and
used the splice plates to match-draw new splice plates. New
splice plates were bolted into position on the new girders in the
shop and were then connected to the existing girders in the field
Melnick 2002. Bethlehem Steel Company received the order to
provide the needed steel materials on June 19, 2002, and started
to ship the materials on June 24, 2002. The company was willing
to disrupt its regular production schedule to meet the required
delivery schedule. The delivery of steel girders was completed six
days ahead of schedule due to the hard-working people in the
steel industry and the bonuses provided by Gilbert.
In addition to efforts from the construction industry, coordi-
nation among federal, state, and tribal governments was crucial
to putting the bridge back into commission on the fast track. As
the sole owner of the Arkansas Riverbed and banks at Webbers
Falls, the Cherokee Nation controls the land around the recon-
struction site. From day one, the Cherokee Nation contributed
land and manpower and facilitated the project by making work
areas easily accessible to the general contractor and subcontrac-
tors “Cherokee Nation” 2002. The Federal Highway Adminis-
tration FHWA approved $3 million in federal emergency relief
funds to get the repair work started immediately FHWA 2002.
Through the repair process, FHWA provided technical expertise
and assistance to ODOT, particularly in the areas of bidding
and contract administration. Both agencies worked together to
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reconstruction contract ready to put out for bid. ODOT also re-
ceived technical help and cooperation from the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, the U.S. Coast Guard, and other state DOTs. Fig. 5
shows the bridge as it was reopened to the traveling public on
July 29, 2002.
Lessons Learned
There were many factors contributing to the success of the re-
sponse to the I-40 tragedy. In order to document what can be
learned from this extreme event, the research team conducted this
case study. During the study, the research team reviewed literature
including information posted on Web sites, interviewed people
who were involved in the repair of the bridge via telephone, and
performed surveys. Notwithstanding its terrible consequences,
the I-40 Webbers Falls Bridge tragedy provides useful lessons for
government agencies, engineering and construction firms, and
material suppliers that must plan for enhanced responses in case
of future incidents. The following summary lists lessons learned
from this extreme event:
1. A quick response to the incident was the key to mitigate the
losses and ease the inconvenience to the traveling public.
Response actions included, but were not limited to, stabiliz-
ing the damaged structure immediately to prevent further
damage to property and injury to traveling public, providing
the required construction equipment and manpower for res-
cue and recovery efforts, establishing detour routes, and
making the detour information available to the general public
as quickly as possible to ease traffic congestion.
2. Using established contracting methods and procedures sped
up the contract negotiation process and avoided future
contract disputes. During the replacement process, ODOT
utilized both traditional contracting methods, such as cost-
plus, time and materials, and lump sum, and innovative
contracting methods such as “A plus B.” All of these deliv-
ered positive results.
3. Huge incentive and disincentive clauses in the contracts
played a very critical role in motivating design firms, con-
tractors, and material suppliers to finish their work on or
ahead of time. In particular, using the “A plus B” contracting
method and offering a huge incentive in the reconstruction
reduced its duration from 72 days to 46 days, 16 hours.
Fig. 5. I-40 bridge reopened to traveling public4. The duration of design for the new structure was shortened
© ASCE / APRIL 2006
because the original design drawings and specifications were
provided quickly to the design firms and ODOT engineers
were on call 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, to answer
any design-related questions.
5. Commitment of the necessary resources such as manpower
from all parties, which included ODOT, design firms, con-
tractors, and material suppliers, accelerated the replacement
project. During the replacement process, all parties worked
overtime. Contractors rebuilt the bridge with two shifts
working around the clock.
6. The spirit of cooperation among the parties involved in the
replacement project was very high. People worked together
as partners. This partnership atmosphere built trust, improved
communications, reduced conflicts, and overcame the bu-
reaucracies and other adversities during the replacement pro-
cess. Suggestions and ideas on how performance could be
improved were discussed daily.
7. Getting strong support from the community allowed the ex-
ecution of the replacement project to run effectively and
smoothly. The Cherokee Nation, who controlled the land
around the site, contributed land and manpower and facili-
tated the project by making work areas easily accessible to
contractors.
8. Changing the normal DOT operational procedures expedited
the reconstruction. For example, ODOT approved the shop
drawings the day they were submitted. Under normal condi-
tions, it would take weeks to get approval. Also, ODOT in-
spectors were sent to the steel plant and fabrication shop to
conduct quality inspection, because the fabrication of the
steel girders was the critical activity in the schedule.
9. The maturity method was used successfully to expedite the
concrete construction process. Time-based specifications for
concrete were modified to implement the maturity method.
Although the replacement project was finished more than 10
days ahead of the original schedule with a good quality and safety
record, there are areas for state DOTs to consider for future im-
provements. These potential improvements may be summarized
as follows:
1. The duration of the emergency bridge replacement project
needs to be estimated more accurately. Nobody predicted that
the replacement of I-40 bridge would be ahead of schedule
by 10 days and 8 hours until the very end of the project. An
accurate estimation of schedule will improve communication
between state DOTs and the traveling public. To achieve this
requires state DOTs to collect real project data and conduct
schedule analysis.
2. State DOTs should continue to search for new construction
technology that could expedite and improve the construction
process. Areas such as underwater demolition and coordina-
tion among the parties involved in the replacement process
show great potential.
3. To expedite the replacement project, both ODOT and private
firms pulled some of their resources such as manpower and
equipment from existing design and construction projects.
This action had negative impacts on existing projects. State
DOTs need to address resource issues in their emergency
response plans. One of the possible solutions is to utilize
retired employees.
Discussion and Conclusion
In addition to the lessons learned, the bridge replacement process
was identified through this detailed case study. A general model
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This model includes three key elements: 1 major players; 2
major tasks; and 3 major decisions. Major players are parties
such as bridge owners, state DOTs, design firms, contractors,
material suppliers, and vendors, who have the responsibility to
conduct the bridge replacement tasks and make major decisions
during the bridge replacement process. Major tasks of bridge re-
placement include traffic detour, demolition, design, contracting,
and reconstruction. At each stage, major decisions need to be
made, which have significant impacts on the outcomes of bridge
replacement. For example, during the design stage, the most im-
portant decision is to decide whether the bridge shall be rebuilt
using an identical structure or a new structure. If the decision is to
use an identical structure, then the design work is simple if the
original drawings and specifications are archived. In some cases,
using an identical structure may not be the best way to replace a
bridge quickly. This was the case for the I-40 Webbers Falls
Bridge. The original structure was a continuous haunched steel
girder bridge. After the incident, precast, prestressed concrete
girders were utilized in Spans 1, 2, and 3 in lieu of the original
steel girders to reduce the material delivery time.
One question that must be considered is: Under what
conditions/justifications shall decision makers/bridge designers
replace the damaged bridge using a different structure instead of
an identical structure? Making such a decision is difficult, and
people who are capable of making the judgment must have con-
siderable experience in the field. However, these people are not
always available, nor do they always have the time to consult all
possible references and review available data.
Bridge replacement is a complicated operation that involves
many parties. It requires each party to make technical and man-
agement decisions at different stages in a very short period of
time. Traditionally, each party makes decisions that best suit his
or her interests, decisions which are known as “local optimal.”
However, local optimal may not lead to the best solution for
the overall replacement project, known as the “global optimal.”
The major challenges of achieving “global optimal” for bridge
replacement are communication and coordination among parties
involved in the replacement process. Currently, there is no sys-
tem that coordinates the different parties’ tasks through gathering,
processing, manipulating, storing, and distributing required
information/data during the replacement process for decision-
Fig. 6. General model for bridge replacementmaking purposes. Poor communication and coordination could
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result in cost overruns and inaccurate construction schedule fore-
casts. For example, nobody predicted that the replacement of the
I-40 bridge would be ahead of schedule by 10 days, 8 hours, until
the very end of the project.
For these reasons, the conclusion is reached that there is an
urgent need to develop a knowledge-based information system for
bridge replacement that integrates all parties’ tasks during the
bridge replacement process. The developed system will help the
major players of bridge replacement to select optimal methods for
traffic detour, demolition, bridge replacement design, contracting,
and reconstruction. If successful, the system not only will im-
prove the communication and coordination among parties, but
will also speed up the bridge replacement process and minimize
impacts to the traveling public after extreme events.
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